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In its application of the equal protection clause to a state statute provid-
ing for inheritance by illegitimate children from intestate fathers, a plural-
ity of the Supreme Court upheld the statute's requirement of a judicial
order determining paternity before permitting inheritance by the child.
Using a substantial relationship test, intermediate between minimal and
strict scrutiny, the plurality found a substantial relationship between the
statute's requirement and the state's interest in the orderly settlement of
estates. With its marked deference to the New York Legislature, the plu-
rality echoed the Labine logic supporting noninterference. Although os-
tensibly applying rigorous equal protection analysis, the plurality, by
allowing New York to impose the strict requirement of a judicial decree
declaring paternity before illegitimates can inherit from intestate fathers,
upheld a statute that severely limits the rights of acknowledged illegitimate
children by excluding forms of proof that do not compromise the state's
interests. Compared to the decision in Trimble, the Court's action is a step
backward in a movement toward granting equal protection to the illegiti-
mate child.
Sharon Nelson Freytag
An Expanded Cause of Action in Texas-Whittlesey v.
Miller: Either Spouse May Recover for the Negligent
Impairment of Consortium
In 1974 Stewart Miller was injured when the vehicle he was driving was
involved in a collision with a vehicle driven by David Whittlesey. In
March 1976 Miller accepted a settlement offer from Whittlesey, thereby
releasing Whittlesey from all liability in connection with the accident.
Three months later, Miller's wife brought suit against Whittlesey, alleging
that she had been deprived of her husband's consortium as the result of
Whittlesey's negligence. The trial court granted Whittlesey's motion for
summary judgment, declaring that a wife cannot recover for loss of consor-
tium resulting from a negligent injury to her husband. The Tyler court of
civil appeals reversed and remanded' on the ground that the Texas Equal
Rights Amendment,2 enacted in 1972, modified the common law to the
96. H. KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 151.
1. Miller v. Whittlesey, 562 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978).
2. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
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extent that it is now improper to deny a cause of action on the basis of the
sex of the party bringing the suit. Whittlesey appealed to the Texas
Supreme Court. Held, affirmed: Either spouse has a cause of action for
loss of consortium that might arise as a result of an injury caused to the
other spouse by a third-party tortfeasor's negligence.3 Wittlesey v. Miller,
572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978).
I. Loss OF CONSORTIUM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WIFE'S CAUSE
OF ACTION
The action for loss of consortium' is the legal remedy provided for an
impairment of the marital relationship, the primary familial interest recog-
nized by the courts.' Although a wide range of definitions has been ad-
vanced by the courts, the concept of consortium may be described as
including "the mutual right of the husband and wife to that affection, sol-
ace, comfort, companionship, society, assistance, and sexual relations nec-
essary to a successful marriage."'6 Some jurisdictions recognize the right of
the husband to the wife's services as an element of consortium; 7 Texas
does not.8 Regardless of which definition a jurisdiction adopts, the emo-
3. In the interest of fairness and sound administration, the court limited the applicabil-
ity of this holding to the present case and those actions arising after Oct. 11, 1978, the effec-
tive date of the decision. It is not clear whether the court intended to limit the applicability
of the holding to actions arising out of injuries suffered after the date of the decision, or to
actions filed after that date. The former interpretation would seem to be the more equitable
approach, since the latter interpretation would allow all actions not barred by the statute of
limitations to be brought, including those already settled or litigated by the physically in-
jured spouse.
4. "Loss of consortium" is more properly classified as an element of damages rather
than a cause of action. Nevertheless, the term has been used so frequently to refer to actions
in which the major element of damages is the impairment of consortium that loss of consor-
tium has come to be known as a cause of action. Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent
Invasion of Consortium, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1341 n.1 (1961).
5. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Note, supra note 4, at 1341.
6. Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1978). Other definitions include:
"[AIll of the elements of the conjugal unity deriving from the status of husband and wife
bound in the closest entity recognized by society," Albert v. McGrath, 278 F.2d 16, 18 (D.C.
Cir. 1960); "Conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of each to the company,
co-operation, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation," McMillan v. Smith, 171 S.E.
169, 170 (Ga. 1933).
7. See, e.g., Miami Transit Co. v. Scott, 58 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1952); Hrvatin v. Cleveland
Ry., 69 Ohio App. 499, 44 N.E.2d 283 (1942).
8. The community property system in Texas operates to preclude the husband's recov-
ery for loss of services in an action for loss of consortium. The community property system
is based upon the concept of marital equality. 1 E. OAKES, SPEER'S MARITAL RIGHTS IN
TEXAS § 92, at 120-21 (4th ed. 1961). See also Leake v. Saunders, 126 Tex. 69, 72-73, 84
S.W.2d 993, 994 (1935). The wife is not obliged to serve the husband; rather, each spouse
has an equal duty to support the community, whether by earning a wage or by managing the
domestic affairs. Gainsville, H. & W. Ry. v. Lacy, 86 Tex. 244, 24 S.W. 269 (1893). It is
therefore the community, not the husband, that suffers when the wife's ability to perform
services is impaired. The husband's loss of comfort and society, however, is a personal in-
jury. Recovery for personal injury is treated as separate property, and therefore a husband
may sue for loss of comfort and society in a separate action for loss of consortium. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.21 (Vernon 1975); see McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31, 49 n.149 (1972); Comment, The Negligent Impairment of Con-
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tional,9 adjuvant, l ° and sexual"' aspects of the marital relationship are
properly treated as a "conceptualistic unity,"' 2 the impairment of which
affords a basis for recovery.
13
Courts and commentators have traditionally distinguished between in-
tentional and negligent impairment of consortium.' 4 Intentional impair-
ment of consortium is not synonymous with a loss of consortium caused by
an intentional tort, but is characterized by the fact that the injurious con-
duct is directed against the marital relationship itself, rather than against
one of the spouses.' 5 Examples of intentional impairment of consortium
are the common law torts of criminal conversation 16 and alienation of af-
fections. '7 While Texas courts have.recognized both of these torts,' 8 the
sortium-A Timefor Recognition as a Cause ofAction in Texas, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 864, 869-
71 (1976).
9. The impairment of conjugal society and companionship plays a major role in the
modern action for loss of consortium. These multifaceted marital interests may be impaired
in a variety of ways. Compare Dehetre v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 161 (D. Me. 1955)
(wife's injury made her nervous and difficult to live with), with Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 390, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974) (husband totally para-
lyzed below the midpoint of chest).
10. The loss of services is one element of consortium for which an accurate calculation
of damages may be available. See Miami Transit Co. v. Scott, 58 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1952); J.
STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY, PERSONAL INJURIES AND DEATH ACTIONS § 205, at 422
(1972). Although Texas does not recognize services as an element of consortium (see note 8
supra), the mutual assistance that accompanies the marital relationship is included within
the Texas definition of consortium. Whitley v. Whitley, 432 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. 1968).
11. While the sexual relationship is one element of consortium, consortium is by no
means a euphemism for sexual relations, nor is evidence of a diminution of sexual activity
required in order to establish loss of consortium. See, e.g., Albert v. McGrath, 278 F.2d 16
(D.C. Cir. 1960); Samuel v. Sanner, 198 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Pa. 1961); Deems v. Western
Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); J. STEIN, supra note 10, § 206, at 423-24; Com-
ment, supra note 8, at 865.
12. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852
(1950).
13. Id.
14. Comment, supra note 8, at 865.
15. Generally, actions for loss of consortium arising out of an intentional tort such as
assault have been treated as actions for the negligent impairment of consortium. J. STEIN,
supra note 10, § 211, at 438-40. Whether intentional, wanton, or negligent, only those torts
that appear to be aimed at the marital relationship itself will give rise to an action for the
intentional impairment of consortium. Comment, The Development of the Wife's Cause of
Actionfor Loss of Consortium, 14 CATH. LAW. 246, 251 (1968).
16. Criminal conversation is the civil action for adultery. "The essential injury to the
husband consists in the defilement of the marriage-bed,-in the invasion of his exclusive
right to marital intercourse with his wife, and to beget his own children." Bigaouette v.
Paulet, 134 Mass. 123, 125 (1883). See also Stark v. Johnson, 43 Colo. 243, 95 P. 930 (1908);
Johnston v. Disbrow, 47 Mich. 59, 10 N.W. 79 (1881). For a history of this action, see
Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 654-60 (1930). See gener-
ally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 875-76 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, Piracy on the
Matrimonial Seas-The Law and the Marital Interloper, 25 Sw. L.J. 594 (1971).
17. When a third party entices one spouse away from the marriage relationship, the
remaining spouse has an action for alienation of affections. Unlike criminal conversation,
alienation of affections does not require adulterous conduct. See Rheudasil v. Clower, 197
Tenn. 38, 270 S.W.2d 345, 346 (1954). See generally Sullivan v. Valiquette, 66 Colo. 170,
180 P. 91 (1919); Grobart v. Grobart, 5 N.J. 161, 74 A.2d 294 (1950); W. PROSSER, supra note
16, § 124, at 876; Lippman, supra note 16, at 654-60. Courts have also recognized an action
for intentional impairment of consortium when the defendant supplies a spouse with addic-
tive drugs. See Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912) (morphine);
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Texas Legislature abolished the action for criminal conversation in 1975
with the adoption of a so-called "anti-heart balm" statute.' 9
Negligent impairment of consortium results from a physical injury to
one spouse caused by the tortious conduct of a third party. The direct
victim, or "impaired spouse,"2 may recover for damages normally associ-
ated with physical injury, such as pain and suffering, medical expenses,
and loss of earnings.2' The "deprived spouse," or husband or wife of the
impaired spouse, may bring a separate action for loss of consortium
against the third-party tortfeasor. This action does not compensate the de-
prived spouse for the physical injury suffered by the impaired spouse, but
rather permits recovery for any impairment of the marital relationship that
directly results from that injury.22 As each spouse suffers a distinct loss,
their respective causes of action are viewed as independent.23 At the same
time, the action for loss of consortium is considered derivative of the im-
paired spouse's action,24 inasmuch as the establishment of the third-party's
liability for the injury to the impaired spouse is a prerequisite to the de-
prived spouse's recovery.25
While the common law recognized both intentional and negligent im-
Moberg v. Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917) (opium). See also Swanson v. Ball, 67
S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940) (liquor supplied to known drunkard).
18. Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1973) (criminal conversation); Kel-
sey-Seybold Clinic v. Maclay, 446 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1971) (alienation of affections).
19. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) reads in full:
Action of Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation not Authorized.
A right of action by one spouse against a third party for criminal conversa-
tion is not authorized in this state.
Since TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b-2, § 3.04 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) pro-
vides that "section captions do not limit or expand the meaning of any statute," this curi-
ously drafted statute abolishes only the action for criminal conversation and not the action
for alienation of affections. See McKnight, Husband and Wfe, Texas Family Code Sympo-
sium Supplement, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 16 (1976).
A number of states have statutorily abolished the actions of criminal conversation and
alienation of affections. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:23-1 (1951); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§ 80a (McKinney 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 170 (Purdon 1965). These acts have been
commonly termed "anti-heart balm" or "heart balm" statutes, based on the incorrect prem-
ise that they were enacted to eliminate the jury's highly speculative task of assessing dam-
ages for hurt feelings. Actually, the actions were abolished because of the high potential for
blackmail and malicious prosecution that accompanied them. See Comment, supra note 8,
at 882; Note, supra note 4, at 1345.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693, Comment a (1969) uses the term "im-
paired spouse" to identify the spouse who suffered the bodily harm as a result of the negli-
gent act. "Deprived spouse" refers to the spouse who brings the action for loss of
consortium.
21. See J. STEIN, supra note 10, §§ 8-29, at 11-45, §§ 58-97, at 93-161.
22. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852
(1950).
23. See Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 195 N.W.2d 480 (1972); J.
STEIN, supra note 10, § 215, at 446.
24. See Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 45 (Fla. 1971); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284
Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969); Comment, supra note 8, at 880.
25. See Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 293 Ala. 429, 304 So. 2d 881 (1974); Mil-
ington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305
(1968).
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pairments of consortium, 26 the cause of action was reserved solely for the
husband.27 Two factors contributed to the wife's inability to recover for an
impairment of consortium. First, the wife was essentially a nonentity in
the eyes of the common law.28 When a woman married, her legal rights
merged with those of her husband.29 She could no longer own property,
enter into contracts, or sue without the joinder of her husband.3" It is fre-
quently remarked that under the common law man and wife were one, and
"he was that one."'" Secondly, the historical development of the concept
of consortium created additional obstacles to the wife's recovery. While
the husband's right to recover was originally based on the loss of the wife's
society, comfort, and affection,3 2 courts also allowed the husband to re-
cover for the loss of the wife's services, drawing an analogy to the action
allowed a master when his servant was injured.33 The impairment of the
husband's interest in the wife's services eventually became the principal
and essential element of the action,34 primarily because damages for loss
of services could easily be calculated.35 The establishment of loss of serv-
ices as an essential element of an action for loss of consortium operated to
deny the wife's action under the master-servant analogy, since a servant
could not sue for the loss of his master's services.
36
The wife's legal status was altered dramatically in the mid-nineteenth
century when many states enacted legislation designed to secure a separate
legal identity for the married woman.37 These Married Woman's Acts
38
evinced a changing view of the marital relationship, which was reflected in
the judicial treatment of the cause of action for loss of consortium. 39 Rea-
soning that the wife's new legal status undermined the rationale behind the
26. See, e.g., Fuller v. Naugatuck Ry., 21 Conn. 557 (1852); Blair v. Chicago & A. Ry.,
89 Mo. 334, 1 S.W. 367 (1886); Sherman v. James, 32 How. Pr. 142 (N.Y. 1866). See gener-
ally STEIN, supra note 10, § 208, at 427-28; Note, supra note 4, at 1341.
27. See generally J. STEIN, supra note 10, § 208, at 427-28; Lippman, supra note 16, at
656; Comment, supra note 15, at 247; Comment, supra note 8, at 865-68; Note, supra note 4,
at 1343-44.
28. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 122, at 859.
30. Id.
31. Acuffv. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 278,78 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra
note 16, § 122, at 859.
32. Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1619); Guy v. Livesey, 81 Eng. Rep. 653
(K.B. 1618); see Note, supra note 4, at 1343. Contra, Lippman, supra note 16, at 653 (con-
sortium originally based on loss of services alone).
33. See, e.g., Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1619). See generally Comment,
supra note 8, at 866-67; Note, supra note 4, at 1343.
34. See, e.g., People's Home Tel. Co. v. Cockrum, 182 Ala. 547, 62 So. 86 (1913); Mead
v. Baum, 76 N.J.L. 337, 69 A. 962 (1908). See generally, Note, supra note 4, at 1343. Texas,
however, has never recognized loss of services as an element of consortium. See note 8
supra.
35. See note 10 supra.
36. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 142-43.
37. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 122, at 861.
38. These acts generally provide that a wife has the right to contract, to own property,
and to sue and be sued without the joinder of her husband. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-4-1 to
-11 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-401 (1971); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.03-.04 (Vernon
1975).
39. Note, supra note 4, at 1345.
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husband's cause of action for loss of consortium, a few jurisdictions abol-
ished the action altogether.4" The majority of jurisdictions, however, re-
acted tothe Married Woman's Acts by recognizing the wife's cause of
action for intentional impairment of consortium.4 Yet even in these juris-
dictions, wives retained their common law status to the extent that they
still were denied the action for negligent impairment of consortium avail-
able to husbands.
42
In justification for the denial of the wife's action for negligent impair-
ment of consortium, courts expressed a variety of rationales. A number of
courts feared that recognition of the wife's action would result in double
recovery insofar as the wife's recovery would include the husband's loss of
earning capacity, an element of damages that the husband could recover
on his own behalf.43 Many courts found the wife's loss too remote and
indirect to support an action in negligence." Others were reluctant to ex-
tend recovery beyond the physically injured party, fearing that each close
relative would seek compensation, resulting in a multiplicity of suits aris-
ing from a single negligent act. 45 Frequently, denial of the wife's recovery
was accompanied by the assertion that any change must come from the
legislature, not the courts.46
With the exception of one short-lived ruling,47 this unanimity continued
until 1950, when the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided the
case of Hiaffer v. Argonne Co.4 8 Judge Clark, writing for the Hitaffer
40. At least one court reasoned that the wife's ability to sue on her own behalf removed
the rationale behind the husband's common law action for loss of consortium, which was
seen merely as a device to secure recovery for the legally powerless wife. See Marri v.
Stamford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 (1911). Other jurisdictions abolished the action for
loss of consortium on the basis that the legal equality of the husband and wife invalidated
the services concept. See, e.g., West v. City of San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 353 P.2d 929, 6
Cal. Rptr. 289 (1960); Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945);
Comment, supra note 8, at 868 n.37.
41. See Note, supra note 4, at 1345.
42. Comment, supra note 8, at 871.
43. See, e.g., Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937);
Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935); Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo.
612, 208 S.W. 462 (1919).
44. See, e.g., Gambino v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo. App. 653, 158
S.W. 77 (1913); Feneff v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909);
Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
45. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Dautel, 192 Kan. 406, 388 P.2d 615 (1964); McKey v. Dow
Chem. Co., 295 So. 2d 516, 518 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
46. Justice Smith of the Michigan Supreme Court spoke harshly of the injustice that
may accompany improvident adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis in this situation:
Were we to rule upon precedent alone, were stability the only reason for our
being, we would have no trouble with this case. We would simply tell the
woman to begone, and to take her shattered husband with her, that we need
no longer be affronted with a sight so repulsive. In so doing we would have
vast support from the dusty books. But dust the decision would remain in our
mouths through the years ahead, a reproach to law and conscience alike. Our
oath is to do justice, not to perpetuate error.
Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 37, 101 N.W.2d 227, 229 (1960).
47. Hipp v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921) (overruled
in Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925)).
48. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
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court, criticized the logic underlying the reasons traditionally advanced in
favor of retaining the common law rule that denies the wife's cause of
action for negligent impairment of consortium. Reasoning that the hus-
band and wife have equal rights in the marriage relation,49 Judge Clark
first rejected the contention that the loss of services is the predominant
component of consortium. The court recognized that the many ingredients
of the conjugal relationship are properly treated as a unity and that it is an
injury to that unity through the impairment of any or all of its elements
that affords a basis for recovery.5 ° The cases predicating recovery on the
loss of services utilize a distinction that is "'arbitrary and, in the main,
fictitious.' 5  The court then dismissed the argument that the loss was too
indirect to be compensable in tort, asserting that "[i]nvasion of the consor-
tium is an independent wrong directly to the spouse so injured."52 Fur-
thermore, the ability of the husband to recover eviscerates such an
argument since the husband's loss of consortium is no more of a direct
injury than the wife's loss.5 3
The Hitaffer court also rejected the contention that recognition of the
wife's cause of action would allow double recovery of the husband's loss of
earning capacity. Since loss of services is only one element of consortium,
the court refused to deny the wife recovery on this basis, reasoning that the
danger of double recovery could be averted by simply subtracting the
amount recovered by the husband for his loss of earning capacity from the
wife's total award for loss of consortium.54 Finally, the court focused on-
the incongruity of allowing the wife to recover for intentional invasions of
consortium but not for negligent invasions.55 This situation has often been
criticized on the basis that the damage caused by a negligent impairment is
usually more severe and deserving of a remedy than the loss suffered
through an intentional impairment.56
Despite the persuasive logic of Judge Clark's opinion, Hilaffer was gen-
erally ignored or rejected in subsequent years.57 By 1960, only seven juris-
dictions had followed the lead of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals.58 In 1954, a Texas court of civil appeals considered the issue in
49. Id. at 816.
50. Id. at 813-14.
51. Id. (quoting Lippman, supra note 16, at 668).
52. Id. at 815 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 814, 819.
55. Id. at 816-17.
56. The argument of Professor Clark typifies the criticism of this situation:
What is the relevant distinction between the case where the husband's affec-
tions are alienated by the "other woman" and the case where he is so seriously
injured by the defendant's negligence that he becomes a human vegetable?
Actually, his wife is worse off in the second case than the first. In the first she
may get a divorce and remarry more happily. In the second case she can look
forward to a lifetime as a combined nurse and breadwinner.
H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 10.5, at 277 (1968).
57. See J. STEIN, s.upra note 10, § 210, at 434-38.
58. Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953); Missouri-Pacific Transp. Co.
v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, 88 Ga.
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the case of Garret v. Reno Oil Co. 59 The court followed the prevailing rule
and held that a Texas wife could not recover for the negligent impairment
of consortium. The opinion of Chief Justice Massey cited Hitaffer and
expressed a partial agreement with the principles espoused in that case.6"
The Fort Worth court succumbed to the weight of precedence, however,
reasoning that "Texas should follow the majority rule until such time as
legislation might effect a change."'" The Garret decision was simplified by
the fact that Mr. Garret was injured on the job and had accepted a settle-
ment from Reno Oil Company's worker's compensation insurer. The
court ruled that even if the denial of the wife's cause of action was an
error, under the Texas Worker's Compensation Act62 there could be no
suit against an employer arising out of a tort occurring in the workplace
after the claim of the injured employee had been disposed of or settled.63
Despite the initial rejection of Hitaffer, after 1960 a trend toward al-
lowing the wife's action became firmly established.64 In 1969, the Ameri-
can Law Institute reversed its position that the wife did not have a cause of
action for harm caused by a tort against the husband, aligning the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts with the Hitaffer rule.65 By 1978, Texas was one of
only ten states that did not allow both spouses to recover for loss of consor-
tium. 6
6
II. WHITTLESEY V. MILLER
In Whittlesey v. Miller the Texas Supreme Court aligned Texas with the
App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 111. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Acuff
v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101
N.W.2d 227 (1960); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959).
59. 271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ refd n.r.e.).
60. Id. at 766-67.
61. 271 S.W.2d at 767.
62. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 3-3a (Vernon 1967) (exclusive remedy and
waiver of common law action provisions of Texas Worker's Compensation Law).
63. 271 S.W.2d at 767.
64. Eg., Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F.2d 71 (D. Mont. 1961); Yonner v.
Adams, 53 Del. 229, 167 A.2d 717 (1961); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881
(1960); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 (1976). Subsection I provides:
One who by reason of his tortious conduct is liable to one spouse for illness or
other bodily harm is subject to liability to the other spouse for the resulting
loss of the society and services of the first spouse, including impairment of
capacity for sexual intercourse, and for reasonable expense incurred by the
second spouse in providing medical treatment.
The proposal to adopt a section allowing the wife recovery was highly controversial. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 695, Note to Institute at 13 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969).
66. The nine other states not recognizing the action were: Connecticut: Lockwood v.
Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956); Kansas: Hoffman v. Dautel, 192
Kan. 406, 338 P.2d 615 (1964); Louisiana: Bourque v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 345 So.
2d 237 (La. Ct. App. 1977); New Mexico: Roseberry v. Starkovitch, 73 N.M. 211, 387 P.2d
321 (1963); North Carolina: Cozart v. Chapin, 35 N.C. App. 254, 241 S.E.2d 144 (1978);
Utah: Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 985 (1972); Virginia: Carey v. Foster, 221
F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Va. 1963); Washington: Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash. 2d 345, 261
P.2d 118 (1953); Wyoming: Bates v. Donnafield, 481 P.2d 347 (Wyo. 1971). Connecticut is
the only state other than Texas that has adopted the Hitaffer position since 1978. See Hop-
son v. St. Mary's Hospital, 40 C.L.J. 30 (Conn. Jan. 23, 1979).
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majority of jurisdictions, holding that either spouse has a cause of action
for the negligent impairment of consortium. This ruling rectified Texas's
paradoxical position that had previously allowed recovery for intentional
invasions of consortium, yet had refused to recognize a cause of action for
negligent invasions of the same interest.6"
The defendant in Whittlesey advanced the traditional arguments previ-
ously accepted by courts in denying the wife recovery.6 8 Nevertheless, the
supreme court rejected the claim that the elements of consortium are too
conjectural to be translated into pecuniary relief, noting that damages for
pain and suffering are compensable, although they are equally conjec-
tural.69 As to the contention that a new cause of action should be created
by the legislature rather than the courts, the court refused to adhere to the
doctrine of stare decisis that had controlled Garret,7" asserting that "[sluch
an abdication of judicial responsibility is no longer called for in light of
present social realities."'" The court stated that legislative authorization
for the cause of action was unnecessary even though marital rights in
Texas are governed by the community property system of the civil law,
since the right to recover for loss of consortium is an action recognized at
common law.72 The supreme court avoided adopting the reasoning of the
court of civil appeals,73 which focused on the Texas Equal Rights Amend-
ment74 and the impropriety of denying a right to recovery on the basis of
sex. The fact that, prior to Whittlesey, no reported Texas decision had held
that a husband could recover for the negligent impairment of consortium
possibly explains the supreme court's reluctance to follow the court of civil
appeals' reasoning, since, without such precedent, a refusal to allow either
spouse a right to recovery equally would satisfy the Texas Equal Rights
Amendment.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the wife's cause of ac-
tion would allow double recovery, stressing that each spouse sustains dis-
tinct injuries, and may only recover his or her own losses.75 Finally, the
court refused to bar the wife's recovery on the basis that her husband had
accepted a settlement from the defendant. Under Texas law each spouse
has "sole management, control, and disposition of his or her separate
property. 76 Since loss of consortium is a personal injury,77 and personal
67. Prior to Whittlesey, no reported Texas decision had ruled on whether a husband had
a cause of action for negligent impairment of consortium. The recognition of intentional
impairment is logically incongruous to the denial of the action for negligent impairment.
See notes 55 & 56 supra.
68. For a detailed examination of each of the traditional reasons for denying the wife
recovery, see Comment, supra note 8.
69. 572 S.W.2d at 667.
70. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
71. 572 S.W.2d at 668.
72. Id. at 668-69.
73. Miller v. Whittlesey, 562 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978).
74. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
75. 572 S.W.2d at 669. See also note 8 supra.
76. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.21 (Vernon 1975).
77. 572 S.W.2d at 669.
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injury recovery is considered separate property,78 a husband may not con-
tract away his wife's claim for loss of consortium without her authority.79
The court's view of the effect of the impaired spouse's settlement on the
deprived spouse's cause of action eliminated the possibility that Texas
would adopt a strict mandatory joinder rule. In the interests of judicial
economy 8° and the equitable calculation of damages,8' several jurisdic-
tions have held that a claim for the negligent impairment of consortium
will not be recognized unless it accompanies the action of the impaired
spouse.82 This rule is harsh, inasmuch as it denies recovery for loss of
consortium when the impaired spouse settles his own claim, or simply re-
fuses to file suit. Although Whittlesey established that a spouse may sue
for loss of consortium without the joinder of the impaired spouse when the
impaired spouse has accepted a settlement offer,83 Texas may still opt to
require joinder of the consortium action once the claim of the impaired
spouse reaches the trial stage. Such a requirement would further judicial
economy and protect the defendant from the threat of multiple litigation,
while avoiding the harsh effects of the typical mandatory joinder rule.84
The supreme court expressly disapproved Garret to the extent that it
conflicted with Whittlesey.85 This limited disapproval apparently leaves
intact Garret's ruling that an action for loss of consortium may not be
brought against the employer of an impaired spouse insured under a
worker's compensation plan. 86 The issue of how the exclusive remedy pro-
visions of the Worker's Compensation Law87 affects an action for loss of
consortium was not before the Whittlesey court, however, and the viability
of the Garret rule that denies recovery for loss of consortium to the spouse
78. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a)(3) (Vernon 1975).
79. 572 S.W.2d at 669. The court did not specify what type of evidence of authority
would be sufficient to bar a claim for loss of consortium after the impaired spouse has set-
tled. Given the emphasis that the court placed on the categorization of recovery for loss of
consortium as separate property, it is possible that only evidence of express authority will
suffice for this purpose. In the future, therefore, defense counsel would be well advised to
secure the signatures of both spouses to any settlement agreement.
80. See Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 466 (Alaska 1974).
81. See Thill v. Modem Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1968).
82. E.g., Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974); Thill v. Modem Erecting Co.,
284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1968); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366
(1972); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); Hopkins v. Blanco,
224 Pa. Super. Ct. 116, 302 A.2d 855 (1973). Butsee Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12
Cal. 3d 390, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153,
302 N.E.2d 555 (1973); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971) (cases holding joinder not
mandatory).
83. 572 S.W.2d at 669; see text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693(2) (1976) reflects a similar motive: "Un-
less it is not possible to do so, the action for loss of society and services is required to be
joined with the action for illness or bodily harm, and recovery for loss of society and services
is allowed only if the two actions are so joined." The Restatement uses the word "possible"
to refer to situations where the deprived spouse has a full opportunity to join in the impaired
spouse's action. It is not possible to join where, for example, the impaired spouse's cause of
action is abated by death, or where the impaired spouse refuses to sue. Id. Comment g.
85. 572 S.W.2d at 669.
86. 271 S.W.2d at 767-68; see text accompanying notes 62 & 63 supra.
87. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 3-3a (Vernon 1967).
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